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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
THE RUTI-SWEETWATER
WARNING TO CREDITORsA POWERFUL LESSON

Secured creditors are often
placed in separate one-member
classes in a chapter 11 reorganization plan because they are rarely
similarly situated. 1 Collateral
types and values 'differ, and the
debtor often proposes to treat
each secured creditor differently.
It is common, therefore, for a
mortgagee, judicial lienor, or
other creditor with a secured
claim to find itself in a class by
itself.
Qualifications for Confirmation
There are two ways in which a
reorganization plan may qualify

* Counsel to the law firm of Levin' &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to the law firm of
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Kadin &
Peddy, Garden City, New York; member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a), which provides that "a plan may place a claim or an
interest in a particular class only if such
claim or interest is substantially similar to
the other claims or interests of such
class."

for confirmation so as to render
the plan binding. 2 The first. road to
confirmation is by satisfying the
requirements listed in Section
1129(a) of the Bankl'Jlptcy Code,
including the need to obtain the
acceptances of every class 'that is
impaired by the plan.:~ A class of
creditors "accepts" the plan if the
members of the class who hold at
least two thirds in amount and one
half in number of the total allowed
claims of the class who vote accept. 4 Only those members of the
class who actually vote to accept
or reject the plan are counted as
class members for this purpose.
The second road to confirmation is the "cramdown" approach
pursuant to Section 1129(b),
wltich is, used if the proponent of
the plan is unable tQ satisfy the
requirement ln Section 1129(a)(8)
that all irp.paired classes accept
the plan. In essence, as long as at
least one impaired class of noninsiders accepts the plan, the plan
may be "crammed dQwn" nonacceptip.g classes if the plan does not

2 See B. Weintraub &
A. Resnick,
Bankruptcy Law Manual~ 8.23 (rev. ed.
1986), for a discussion of confirmation requirements.
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
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"discriminate unfairly" and is
"fair arid equitable," as that term
of art is ·defined in Section
1129(b)(2), with respect to each
impaired class that has not accepted the plan.
The-,court must hold a confirmation hearing and is compelled to
confirm a plan if all the requirements.of Section 1129(a) are met.s
If the requirements of Se~tion
1129(a) are met, including acceptance by every impaired class, the
proponent ·need not present any
evidence showing that the plan
do~s not "unfairly discriminate"
and is "fair and equitable." But
what happens if every member of
a particular impaired Glass of creditors fails to submit a ballot' and,
accordingly, neither accepts nor
rejects the plan? Suppose that the
class. does not object or even appear at the confirmation hearing.
Should' the court confirm the plan,
even though it is not fair and
equitable under Section 1129(b)?
Did such a class accept the plan or
did it reject it?
These questions are especially
important for the secured creditor
that finds. itself in a class by itself..
If it does not vote at all and does
not objy~i to confirmation of the
plan-in otlier words, the secured
creditor does absolutely nothing
in the case-is it proper for the
court to confirm the plan without
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satisfying the "fair and equitable"
standard?
The Tenth Circuit's recent opinion in In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc. 6
is the only court of appeals decision on the issue of whether a
class has· accepted or rejected a
plan when no member votes or
objects to confirmation. Although
improperly decided, Ruti-Sweetwater is a powerful lesson for
creditors who, secure in the protection of the "fair and equitable"
doctrine, think that they are
guaranteed absolute priority of
their claims while 'ignoring the
case by not voting or objecting to
confirmation.
The Run-Sweetwater Case

Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., and
seven related companies filed
chapter 11 petitions resulting in
the consolidation of the eight
cases for'the purpose of administration. The debtors were actively
engaged in the vacation timeshare business, and their complex
120-page reorganization plan included eighty-three separate
clas·ses of secured creditors and
forty separate classes of timeshare owners. A separate class
was created for three related individuals, the Heins, who held a
judgment lien on a specific parcel
of real property to secure payment of $30,000 plus $8,000 interest. The reorganization plan

5 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1128(a), ll29(a) ("The
court shall confirm a plan only if all of the
following requirements are met: . . . . ").
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836 F.2d 1263 (lOth Cir. 1988).
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treated the Heins as a separate
class and provided that the Heins'
lien was to be transferred to U!tsold time-share intervals so that
the Heins would realize a small
portion of their claim upon the
sale of each interval. The pl~m
also provided that the Heins
would receive the entire amol!-nt
of their claim, with interest,
within forty-eight months after
confirmation. Clearly, the Heins'
claim was "impaired" under the
plan. 7
The Heins did not exercise their
right to vote on the plan and did
not file any written objections to
confirmation. Nineteen other
classes of secured claims also
failed to vote. Moreover, the
Heins did not appear at the
confirmation hearing at which the
bankruptcy court ruled in the 'absence of objection that the nonvoting creditors were deemed to
have accepted the plan, for the
purpose· of relieving the plan
proponent of the need to satisfy
the cramdvwn requirements of
Section 1129(b). Therefore, there
was no need to show that the plan
was "fair and equitable."
Only four days after the court
entered an order confirming the
plan, the court held a hearing on
the distribution of the proceeds
from the sale of the parcel of land
in which tlie Heins had their lien.
The court previously approved

the sale of ,the prqperty free and
clear of a}.t liens, including the
Heins lien, pursuant to Section
363(f) or" tb.e B~nki;uptcy Code.
The Hews appeared with counsel
for the first 'ti!,'n,e at the bearing on
distributio.n .of 'the safes proceeds
and they challenged the reorganization p\an.
p,a,rticular, they
challenged the provi~ions of the
plan under Which the. iic:m was removed from Ute property and
transferred to· ..the
unsolQ
·tim~'
I
.
share intervals. 'Jh,e bankruptcy
court tuled that the Hei~s were
bound bY, · tl).e ' pr~visions of the
confirmed plan that removed their
lien from 'the real property that
was sold free· atid clear of liens
prior to th~ confirmati<:>n date.

7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 on impairment of
claims.

8 In re Ruti-S\yeet,\)'iitet, In,c., 57 Bankr.
748 (Bankr. P: Utah 1985).

·In

The

Iss.~ .on

Appeal

The Heigs &PP,eaied Jhe _order
confirming th~ f>lan Jo ,the district
court, w,hich viewed the appeal as
raising a sjogl~ issue.: "whether a
non-voting, qon;._objecting creditor who is the only member of a
class is dee.Q1eg t9 .have accepted
the plan fat purppses of 11 u.s. c·.
' .
§ 1129:" 8
The district fOUrt c~tTectly observed thc:tt Se~tiqn 11'f6fa) of the
Code does not requ,ire a creditor
to vote; it provides otJ,ly that a
creditor m,ay ac~eBf qr reject a
·
plan.
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However, the Code does not indicate whether a failure to vote is
deemed to be an acceptance. It is
undisputed that under the former
Bankruptcy Act a failure to vote
was corlsidered a rejection of the
plan .... The presumption under
the prior law that non-voting creditors reje'cted the plan has been removed. Non-voting creditors are
deemed neither to have accepted
the plan nor rejected it; they are
simply bound by the result produced by those who vote. The
neces&ity of deeming a failure to
vote as pither an acceptance or a
;ejection of a plan arises only when
no members of a class cast a vote. 9

The
district
court
then
stretched the absence of any congressional intent on this issue to
reach- its conclusion that a class
that does not vote at all is deemed
to have accepted the plan:
Congress, when it eliminated the
presumption of rejection, apparently ·overlooked the possibility
that all the members of a class
might fail to vote. this court finds it
difficult to believe that Congress intended on the one hand to deny a
non-votiJ1g creditor the b(lnefits of
section 1129(b) whenever other,
more concerned, members of the
class voted to accept a plan; but, on
the other hand' .to reward a non~
voting creditor's apathy or
carelessness with those benefits
whenever the other members of the
class also fail to vote. to

P

Id. at 749-750.
Id. at 750.

10
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It is important to note that the
district court did not merely rule
that the Heins did not have standing to challenge the order of
confirmation on appeal because
they did not object below. Such a
holding would not have been unnecessarily far~reaching. Instead,
the district court went a considerable step further an<:f, creating
new substantive law on confirmation requirements, held that it is
not necessary for a plan proponent to show, or·for the court to
be concerned with, the ''fair and
equitable" and "unfafr discrimination" aspects of cramdown
under Section. 1129(1)) with respect to an impaired class when
no member of the. class votes or
objects to confirmation:
Accordingly, the court concludes
as a matter of law. that a nonvoting, non-objecting creditor who
is a member of a class that casts no
votes is deemed to have accepted
the plan of reorganization for the
purposes of section 1129(a)(8) and
ll29(b). Because the Heins, the
only members of the class, did not
vote, they are deemed to have accepted the plan. It was not necessary for the part of the plan that
affected the Heins to meet the
sta,ndards imposed by section
ll29(b). 11

·The Court of Appeals Affirms

The court of appeals affirmed
the district court decision after
II

/d.
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reviewing the issue de novo as a
mixed question of law and fact.
The holding, which was that the
Heins' failure to either vote or object constituted acceptance of the
plan, was the same as that of the
district court:
To hold otherwise would be to endorse the proposition that a creditor may sit idly by, not pll.rticipate
in any manner· in the formulation
and adoption of a plan in reorganization and thereafter, subsequent
to the adoption of the plan, raise a
challenge to the plan for the first
time. Adoption of the Heins' approach would effectively place all
reorganization plans at risk in
terms of reliance and finality. 12

The court of appeals also agreed
with the district court's finding
that "creditors are obligated to
take an active role in protecting
their claims." 13
The problem with the court's
reasoning is that these concerns
regarding finality and the prevention of a nonobjecting party from
attacking a confirmation order for
the first time after the hearing is
concluded could have been dealt
with by merely holding that the
Heins do not have standing to appeal the confirmation order because of their failure to object below. Such a narrow holding would
not have had the improper effect
of permitting bankruptcy courts in
future cases to confirm plans

under Section 1129 without making an independent inquiry as to
whether they are- "fair and equitable" regarding impaired classes
whose members did not yote on a
plan or formally ·object to confirmation.
The most troubling rationale
found in the court's opinion is that
the Bankruptcy Code, unlike the
former Bankruptcy Act, "does
not indicate whether ,a failure to
vote, such as here, is deemed to
be an acceptance or rejectio.n of
the plan." 14 The court seems to
ignore the fact that Section
ll26(c) of the Code provides that
a class of claims has accepted a
plan if it "has been accepted by
creditors . . . that hold at least
two-thirds in amount and more
than one-half in number of the,allowed elaims of such class held by
creditors . . . that have accepted
or rejected such plan." 15 Also,
Bankruptcy Rule 30 l SCc) requires
tlrat "an acceptance ~r rejection
shall be in writing ... be signed by
the creditor . . . and conform to
Official Form No. 30. ''Therefore,
it is clear from the Bankruptcy
Code and the Bankruptcy Rules
that "acceptance" means actual
acceptance ·and that acceptance
may ·not be implied ·by silence
alone when dealing with a impaired class.
The court of appeals fo!Jnd
comfort in the fact that the BankId.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c} (emphasis added).
14

tz 836 F.2d a,t 1266-1267.
13 ld. at 1267.

1$
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ruptcy Code contains certain presumptions regarding acceptance
and rejection, even though these
presumptions clearly had no relevance to the issue before it. Section 1126(f) pro¥ides that an unimpaired class is conclusively
presumed to have accepted the
plan. 1 6 Section 1126(g) provides
that a class is deemed to have rejected a plan if the plan does not
entitle &1ass members to receive
or retain anything. After mentioning such presumptions in the
Bankruptcy Coder the court of
appeals slipped comfortably to its
conclusion by creating a ne'Y presumption:
Since the Heins did not object to
the Pl!in at any time prior to its
confirmation and because the
Heins unilaterally opted not to vote
on the confirmation of the Plan, the
bank,J;,uptcy court did not err in presum:jng their acceptance of the Plan
for purposes of§ 1129(b).
Once acceptance was properly presumed, the court was not obligated
to inquire as to whether the Plan
tliscriminated unfairly or was not
fair and equitable to the Heins
under§ it29(b)(l). When the Heins
failed. to 1 object to the Plan, they
waived their -right to challenge tbe
Plan or to assert, after _the fact, that
the Plan (liscriminated unfairly and
was not fair and equitable.l7

16 See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 on impairment
of claims.
11836 F.2d'at 1267-1268.
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We questiQn whether the court
of appea:ls gave proper. consideration to the difference between
(1) holding that the Heins waived
their right to challenge the
confirmation order on appeal because they failed to timely object
to confirmation in the bankruptcy
court and (2) holding that their
failure to vote or object is d~emed
acceptance for Section 1129(a)(8)
purposes. The former holding
would not r~Iieve the bankruptcy
court in future .f;ases from requiring the propone.nt of a plan to
prove by competent evidence that
the requirements for cramdown
found in Section 1129(b) are
satisfied regarding nonvoting,
nonobjecting classes. It would
also be consistent with numerous
cases holding that the bankruptcy
court should not confirm a plan
without being satisfi~ that the
confirmation require.ments set
forth in Section 1129 are met, despite the absence of objections. 18
On the other hand, the latter holding m~s that bankruptcy courts
may .disregard entirely all cramdown requirements designed to
protee.t nonaccepting i~paired
classes when the ·classes fail to
vote or object to confirmation.
Although the reach of RutiSweetwater goes beyond the
treatment of secured creditors and
1s See, e.g., In re Holthoff, 58 Bankr.
216 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); In re Coastal
Equities, Inc., 33 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1983).
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may be applied to unsecured creditors and equity interest qolders,
secured creditors are the most
vulnerable because of the commo·n practice of placing each secur~d creditor in a separate class.
Thus, if a one-member secured
creditor class fails to vote or object, the creditor may no longer
rely on the expectation that the
bankruptcy court will refuse to
confirm the plan unless and until it
is satisfied by the evidence that
the plan is fair and equitable as to
that creditor.

tion 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code and Bankruptcy Rule
3018(c) in concluding that mere
failure to vote for a plan does not
constittlte acceptance of the plan
for Section 1129 purposes. However, when faced with a choice of
following the holding of RutiSweetwater or the holding of
Townco, the bankruptcy court in
In re Campbelf2 1 concurred with
the reasoning of Ruti-Sweetwater:
A single creditor or class of creditors should not, by their total inaction, be able to force a debtor to
have to resort to the cramdown
process to obtain confirmation of a
plan when all of the other confirmation requirements, including the
affirmative acceptance of the plan
by at least one impaired class, have
been met. 22

A Better Approach: Townco Realty

A better approach to the issue
presented in Ruti-Sweetwater was
illustrated inln re Townco Realty,
Inc. 19 The debtor in Townco had
six creditors, with one creditor
holding 99.9 percent of the total
debt and a mortgage on the debtor's only asset, a shopping mall.
None of the members of the class
of unsecured creditors voted on
the plan. The bankruptcy court
stated:
The debtor assumes . . . that the
failure to vote constitutes acceptance of the plan. That is not the
case. There is no predicate in the
statute or the rules for this conclusion.20

The bankruptcy court in
Townco properly relied on Sect9 81 Bankr. 707 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1987).
20 Id. at 708.

Conclusion
A clear reading of the Bankruptcy Code and BanKruptcy
Rules should have led all of these
courts to the conclusion that a
nonvoting, nonobjecting class is
entitled to "fair and equitable"
protection under tbe cramdown
provisions of Section 1129(6) and
that the bankruptcy court should
require the PrQponent of the plan
to show that such cramdown
standards are met. However, with
Ruti-Sweetwater and Campbell as
authority, cre<titors in a particular
21 89 Bankr. 187 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1988).
'2 2 /d. at 188.
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class should be certain to have at
least one memb'er of the class actually vote to reject a plan if they
want to tely on the cramdown
protection of Section 1129(b). In
fact, every creditor who wants
Section 1129(b) cramdown protection should vote because of an
even more outrageous suggestion
contained in a footnote in the dis-

368
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trict court's decision in RutiSweetwater: •'The court expresses no opinion on whether a nonvoting creditor whose class votes
against a plan will be able to ride
the coat tails of the class and have
the benefits of section 1129(b). "23

23

57 BR at 750 n.3.

